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The aim of this paper is to study the short and long-term fertility effects of mass violent 
conflict on different population sub-groups. The authors pool three nationally representative 
demographic and health surveys from before and after the genocide in Rwanda, identifying 
conflict exposure of the survivors in multiple ways. The analysis finds a robust effect of 
genocide on fertility, with a strong replacement effect for lost children. Having lost siblings 
reduces fertility only in the short term. Most interesting is the continued importance of the 
institution of marriage in determining fertility and in reducing fertility for the large group of 
widows in Rwanda. 
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1 Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to analyze if, and in what way, mass violent conflict affects fertility. It 
is well known that shocks can have significant effects on fertility, with the nature of the 
shock driving the nature of the impact. In the case of mass violent conflicts, very little is 
known about their effects on fertility. Hence we aim to understand the effects of off-spring 
and sibling mortality, widowhood and sex imbalance on short- and long-term changes of 
fertility in the post-conflict period. This paper – a product of the Gender and Development 
Unit, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network – is part of a larger effort in 
the department to study gender differentials in response to conflict, with generous funding 
from the Government of Norway. 
Our analysis contributes to two literatures. First, it teaches us how conflict affects individual 
human behavior and well-being, which is a small but growing area of research. Second, we 
learn more about the drivers of fertility in times of sudden structural change. The occurrence 
of mass violent conflict can be seen, from a methodological perspective, as an opportunity 
to analyze fertility responses to aggregate and individual shocks, and to understand fertility 
as a coping strategy. Given the importance of relative population shares of various 
ethnicities in conflict-prone societies and given the importance of fertility for individual and 
household well-being in very poor economies, understanding the relationship between 
conflict and fertility is also important from a policy perspective. 
We study the specific case of the 1994 Rwandan genocide, using three waves of Rwanda 
Demographic and Health Surveys (RDHS) collected in 1992, 2000 and 2005. Our research 
strategy includes cross-sectional analyses of the post-genocide data as well as analyses of 
pooled data from before and after the genocide. This allows us to compare the determinants 
of fertility for sub-samples of women of the same age groups across the survey years. The 
most challenging identification of an effect of conflict is at the micro-level – especially if the 
survey does not ask about an individual’s exposure to conflict explicitly (Brück et al. 2010). 
Two alternative categories of proxies for conflict exposure are employed to distinguish 
women who were and were not likely to be affected directly by violence. Each category 
represents a transmission mechanism of conflict: (1) replacement effects and (2) marriage 
market effects. We interpret the coefficients for these variables as the ‘pure’ conflict effects  2
 
on fertility, bearing in mind that conflict may also shape fertility indirectly through the other 
variables included in the regressions.  
We find very clear and robust effects of conflict on fertility. Three effects are particularly 
noteworthy. First, we can identify a strong replacement effect of conflict on fertility. This 
holds both for the short- and the long-term post-war period. Second, we find that sibling 
mortality, which we consider as a strong indicator of direct exposure to conflict, has a 
noticeable impact in the short-term only, perhaps associated with the stigma of being part of 
a genocide victim household. Third, we observe a clear impact of conflict on marital status 
and the marriage market and hence on fertility. The persistence of the institution of 
marriage in determining fertility is perhaps the most surprising finding of this study. 
The paper advances the literature in several ways. By defining and contrasting several 
conflict exposure measures, our analysis disentangles the impact of conflict into the direct 
individual effects of conflict and cohort-specific excess mortality rates that operate through 
the marriage market. By pooling multiple, very detailed and large-N cross-sectional surveys 
we succeed in studying very differentiated impacts of mass violent conflict on fertility across 
time, cohorts and sub-groups. Population pressures on land and relative changes in ethnic 
population shares may have contributed to the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. Fertility, if not 
reduced sustainably, continues to be a potential driver of future tensions in Rwanda. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section  2 reviews the current knowledge on the links 
between violent conflict and fertility, followed by a section introducing the case study and 
summarizing the events of 1994 in Rwanda. The data used and the conflict proxies are 
discussed in Section 4 while Section 5 outlines the estimation approach. The next section 
presents and discusses descriptive and multivariate results. Section 7 concludes.  
2  Review of previous research and hypotheses 
Fertility in developing countries is shown to be determined by the socio-economic status of 
each woman and her partner (age, ethnicity, religion, education and employment 
opportunities, although the latter two may be endogenous to fertility), partnership 
characteristics (civil status, marital duration, number of previous unions), knowledge of and 
access to contraception, local characteristics (including health infrastructure and child  3
 
mortality), and institutional arrangements (such as social support mechanisms).
1 Fertility 
and family planning are stochastic processes in themselves; this is also true of many of the 
drivers of fertility. There is a growing literature studying the effects of uncertainty and 
shocks on fertility.
2 A small number of studies investigate the determinants of fertility in 
(post-)conflict economies (for instance, Avogo and Agadjanian 2008; Henry 1966; Hynes et 
al. 2002; Khlat et al. 1997; Woldemicael 2008). A review of research in this field is provided 
by Hill (2004).  
For example, Lindstrom and Berhanu (1999) study the specific impacts of conflict on fertility 
in Ethiopia. They find a sharp temporary decline in fertility during the early years of violent 
conflict and famine, followed by a rebound in fertility. During the second decade of conflict, 
which is paralleled with economic downturn, fertility decreases steadily and both sharp 
declines and rebounds are less pronounced. Lindstrom and Berhanu suggest that Ethiopian 
couples postpone births as a strategy to avoid impoverishment in the short term, thereby 
accepting higher risk in the long term, when fewer children are present to secure their own 
livelihood at old age. Verwimp and Van Bavel (2005) explore the drivers of fertility among 
Rwandan refugee women. Again, conflict, and the related processes of displacement and 
famine are found to affect fertility. 
Randall (2005) finds that Tuareg people in Mali maintain constant patterns of fertility and 
age of marriage in a time period characterized by inter-ethnic conflict and change. Randall’s 
interpretation of this phenomenon is that reproductive behavior is one important feature of 
cultural identity. By strengthening traditional marriage and fertility patterns, Tuareg people 
sharpen the boundaries towards other ethnic groups, thereby making themselves ‘visible 
and readily identifiable in case of future conflicts’ (Randall 2005: 326), thus perhaps turning 
around the decline in fertility that may have been observed in the case of peace. In a study 
of post-war Angola, Agadjanian and Prata (2002) find women living in conflict-affected 
regions have lower fertility rates during conflict, followed by a baby boom in the same 
regions once conflict ends. A similar pattern appears in Cambodia (de Walque 2006), where 
the genocide under the Khmer Rouge caused a severe shortage of eligible men, as in 
Rwanda, hence reducing fertility. 
                                                 
1  Examples are Ainsworth et al. (1996), Angeles et al. (2005), and Benefo and Schultz (1994). 
2  See Clay and Vander Haar (1993) for an early treatment of the issue.  4
 
While the cited studies demonstrate that conflict exposure significantly impacts fertility, 
there are three gaps in the empirical literature. First, despite these existing studies, still little 
is known about how violent conflict and its legacy affect fertility. In his review of the studies 
on health issues in post-war countries, Urdal (2010) concludes that most research in this 
field focuses on the immediate health consequences of conflict, which, in turn, may have 
indirect consequences on fertility (e.g. Bozzoli and Brück 2008; Bundervoet et al. 2009; 
Verwimp and van Bavel 2005).  
Second, few of the existing studies analyzing fertility in post-war economies pinpoint the 
channels through which the mechanism works. As Urdal (2010) argues, these channels may 
vary with the type and duration of a given conflict. Hence there is a need to account for the 
specific ways in which conflict impacts fertility – ranging from the individual level to regional 
effects and to demographic issues. At the individual level, the loss of a brother or sister may 
affect a woman’s fertility differently from the loss of a son or a daughter. While all of them 
are close kin, these persons may have different roles in a woman’s livelihood, her old age 
security, in providing dowry or arranging a marriage. Fertility may be driven by demographic 
issues such as unbalanced sex ratios. This, in turn, reduces the number of unions or changes 
its characteristics, such as the age balance between partners, as argued by Shemyakina 
(2006), irrespective of a woman’s immediate exposure of violence. At the regional level, 
conflict may, for example, destroy health infrastructure or regional employment 
opportunities.  
Third, individuals may experience increased or decreased fertility at different points of time 
due to conflict. Such differences may emerge along ethnic, regional or cohort-specific lines. 
On the one hand, fertility can increase in times of conflict as a result of gender-based 
violence (such as war-rapes), a change in social norms making sex outside of marriage more 
common, the loss of family planning infrastructures, or lower opportunity costs for female 
time. At the individual level replacement fertility may be driven by requirements on 
household composition to perform various agricultural tasks and to secure a livelihood of 
mothers at old age. At the group level replacement fertility may be influenced by the 
perceived need to maintain or raise the population share of one’s own group. In fact, the 
demographic balance between the opposing groups is often an implicit but important stake 
in the conflict (Fargues 2000; Tabeau and Bijak 2005). On the other hand, fertility may 
decline during conflict because of the debilitating effects of trauma on reproductive health,  5
 
the break-up of marriages and widowhood, displacement, the separation of spouses, the 
loss of financial ability to support more children, and the loss of health infrastructure 
increasing numbers of still-born babies and maternal mortality. It is conceivable that these 
two effects average out in studies adopting a more aggregate perspective, hence 
underestimating the scale of the structural changes induced by mass violent conflict.  
The reasons for these shortcomings may be related to a lack of suitable data in many cases. 
Often analyses can only be undertaken at a descriptive level, which prevents controlling for 
socio-economic factors (e.g. de Walque 2006) or because the different ways conflict impacts 
individuals (cf. Verwimp et al. 2009) cannot be identified clearly with the available data 
(Brück, et al. 2010). 
We therefore contribute to this body of research in three ways. First, we disaggregate the 
impact of the Rwandan genocide into two possible channels, which we then test with 
individual data. Second, we disaggregate impacts for various groups and cohorts, hence 
distinguishing between what may be ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ effects of conflict on fertility. 
Third, we test the effects of conflict over the short- and the long-term. In contrast with the 
nascent literature on this theme, we do not predict a uniform trend for lower fertility due to 
conflict. Rather, we expect ‘sub-patterns’ to emerge. For example, war widows may have 
lower fertility while women less well entrenched in traditional culture may have more sexual 
partners and hence greater fertility. 
3  Conflict and demographics in Rwanda 
In the pre-colonial era, the terms Hutu and Tutsi mainly depicted different occupational 
groups – cultivators and pastoralists, respectively – who shared otherwise similar cultural 
practices and a common language (Newbury 1988; Prunier 1999).
3 Classification into either 
group depended largely on wealth, most importantly on cows. Accumulating cows and 
deriving a livelihood from pastoralism permitted people to transcend the categories, which 
allowed for considerable flexibility. The German colonial administration and later the 
Belgians (who ruled Rwanda after WWI) favored Tutsi whom they considered as the local 
                                                 
3  For an analysis of the historical context, see Desforges (1999), Mamdani (2001), Newbury and Newbury (1999), Prunier 
(1999) and the special issue on Rwanda of ISSUE (1995).   6
 
elite. Under the influence of the United Nations, the Belgians increasingly shifted their 
support to Hutu from the 1950s onwards. Parallel to the cementing of a societal hierarchy in 
which the Tutsi minority dominated the Hutu majority, the meaning of the terms switched 
into ethnic categories (Desforges 1999). 
Political power changed after the Hutu staged a successful coup and achieved independence 
from Belgium in 1962, with Grégoire Kayibanda, a Hutu, becoming the first president 
(Prunier 1999). In the following decades, ethnically motivated violence and political 
campaigns against Tutsi resulted in waves of Tutsi fleeing Rwanda for neighboring countries. 
Attempts by exiled Tutsi to regain power in Rwanda posed a constant threat to the Hutu 
government, which increased tensions between the two groups. The livelihoods of Hutu and 
Tutsi did not differ in post-independence Rwanda (Desforges 1999). However, Tutsi were 
discriminated against in the access to education and employment, and discriminatory 
policies forbade Hutu army members from marrying Tutsi. Also, Tutsi tended to marry later 
than Hutu (Jayaraman et al. 2009), which will be discussed again in Section 6d. 
Up until the late 1980s, the government under President Juvénal Habyarimana (who 
forcefully took power in 1973) supported a peasant ideology that valued children and large 
families (Verwimp and van Bavel 2005). This paralleled the strong involvement of the 
Catholic Church in Rwandan politics and everyday culture, which effectively suppressed the 
availability of contraceptives. Also, cultural norms attached to a traditional lifestyle and the 
importance of family and kinship resulted in a low demand for family planning (May et al. 
1990). Fertility in Rwandan ranked among the highest in the world, with total fertility rates 
of 8.5 in 1983 (INSR and ORC Macro 2006: 38). In turn, this aggravated pressure on already 
scarce farming land in a country with an extremely high population density, thus 
contributing to social tensions (André and Platteau 1998). Studies conducted in Rwanda in 
the early 1990s conclude that in the absence of public old-age social security, children 
contribute significantly to the economic well-being of the parents (Clay and Vander Haar 
1993). The type of support differs by the gender of the child: Cash support is mostly given by 
sons, while daughters contribute more labor and gifts-in-kind than sons. Children continue 
supporting the parents even after forming independent households by themselves. 
Moreover, Rwandan households with larger land endowments tend to have higher fertility, 
as these households can afford better nutrition and health care, which in turn increases the 
supply of children (Clay and Johnson 1992).  7
 
After the genocide, young Rwandan men continue to be faced with notions of masculinity 
that depict men as providers and breadwinners (Sommers 2006a; 2006b). For instance, a 
young man in Rwanda can only get married in a culturally accepted manner after building a 
house and acquiring land to support his family. Given the pressure on land, few employment 
opportunities, and the loss of senior relatives during the genocide many young men could 
hardly achieve these prerequisites. Yet despite these challenges, the norms and gender roles 
may continue to exert significant effects on partnership and fertility. 
The violence peaked with the 1994 genocide, when extremist Hutu militia known as 
Interahamwe, the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) and Rwandan police forces organized 
massacres against the Tutsi minority and, to a lesser degree, moderate Hutu intellectuals 
who were opposed to the regime of President Habyarimana. The human suffering during the 
genocide was enormous. Death toll estimates range between at least 500,000  deaths 
(Desforges 1999; Prunier 1999) to over a million deaths (African Rights 1995), about 
10 percent of the 1994 population. Most of these individuals were Tutsi, killed in one-sided 
violence, causing the death of an estimated 75 percent of the Tutsi population (Desforges 
1999). A smaller number of soldiers died in combat between the FAR and the rebel army, the 
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), which eventually stopped the genocide and took power. The 
breakdown of the health care system and displacement also contributed (although to a 
much lower extent) to excess mortality (de Walque and Verwimp 2010). Sexual violence was 
widespread during the genocide, leading to a cohort of children conceived through rape 
(Nowrojee 1996). 
Estimates of death tolls are politically sensitive in Rwanda and the available demographic 
data are scant. Reconciliation policies enacted after 1994 have strictly prohibited the 
collection of information on ethnicity that would facilitate the reconstruction the 
demographic impact of the genocide in more detail. The few studies that attempt to 
differentiate deaths according to gender (e.g. de Walque and Verwimp 2010; Ministry for 
Local Government 2002) conclude that adult men made up the majority of casualties.
4  
                                                 
4  Using population data from the province of Gikongoro, Verpoorten (2005) concludes that Tutsi women had only a 
moderately higher probability of survival than Tutsi men, with the respective probabilities being 0.29 and 0.21.  8
 
In the aftermath of the genocide, sex ratios (the ratio of males to females) became severely 
unbalanced. Primarily, this is because more men and boys than women and girls died. 
Further, about 2  million Rwandans, commonly referred to as new caseload refugees, 
escaped to the Democratic Republic of Congo and Tanzania immediately after the genocide 
in fear of revenge by the RPF and persecution for their crimes. Among the new caseload 
refugees were perpetrators of the genocide, who were mostly males, and Rwandan civilians. 
About 600,000 new caseload refugees returned from Congo to Rwanda and another 500,000 
refugees returned from Tanzania to Rwanda in late 1996 (World Bank 2003). A smaller 
portion of the new caseload refugees, mostly former militias, became involved in the Congo 
wars and were repatriated to Rwanda in the period 1997-2000 (Verwimp and van Bavel 
2005). On the other hand, about 700,000 Tutsi people returned to Rwanda from exile in 
Uganda shortly after the genocide (Newbury 2005). This group of old caseload refugees 
either fled Rwanda during waves of ethnic violence against Tutsi since independence or were 
the offspring of Rwandan exiles.  
Grasping the demographic imbalance in numbers, Fig. 1 depicts sex ratios for five-year age 
groups calculated from the (pre-genocide) 1991  Census and the (post-genocide) 
2002 Census for Rwanda. The graph allows comparing the relative distribution of men and 
women across age at the two points in time. Clearly, in 2002 there are shortages of men that 
may be attributable to genocide-related excess male deaths (i.e. shortages of men even 
larger than prior to the genocide for some age groups). The shortage of men is most 
pronounced in the groups of 20-45  year olds and the elderly older than 55  years. An 
immediate implication that follows from the unbalanced sex ratios is the reduced chance of 
women to get married to men of similar age for women in the age group most affected by 
genocide or to remarry after being divorced or widowed. This is hence a topic that we will 
investigate in more detail below.  
4 Data   
4.1  Rwanda Demographic and Health Surveys 
The analysis builds on three cross-sectional Rwanda Demographic and Health Surveys (RDHS) 
collected in 1992 (before the genocide) (ONAPO and Macro International 1994), 2000 (after 
the genocide) (ONAPO and ORC Macro 2001) and 2005 (INSR and ORC Macro 2006). The  9
 
data in each survey is representative of households at the national and in 1992 and 2005 at 
the provincial level, based on a stratified survey design. In the 2005 RDHS, each of Rwanda’s 
twelve provinces was divided into an urban and a rural stratum, resulting in 23 strata (the 
province of Kigali City only consists of urban areas). In a first stage, primary sampling units 
were drawn from a listing of enumeration areas prepared for the 2002 Census. Primary 
sampling units were selected with probability proportional to size regarding the number of 
households in each enumeration area. This exercise was conducted separately in every 
stratum. In a second stage, 20  and 24  households within each urban and rural primary 
sampling unit were drawn, respectively.
5 In the following, all analyses account for the survey 
design and population weights are used as recommended by the data providers.  
In every selected household, all women of age 15-49 years who were either usual household 
members or who were present in the household on the night before the interview were 
eligible for interviewing. In half of all selected households, an additional questionnaire was 
administered to survey all men aged 15-59  years about their health status. The 
questionnaire design remained broadly similar across the survey waves. Still, both the 
number of variables and the sample size increased over time with about 6,500, 10,600 and 
11,300 prime age women included in the 1992, 2000 and 2005 survey, respectively.  
The RDHS include detailed information on women’s birth histories (permitting the 
calculation of a fertility indicator to be used as the dependent variable below), maternal and 
child health, marital history, access to health services, domestic violence, sibling mortality, 
and women’s socio-economic characteristics, including schooling and main occupation. In 
contrast to LSMS-type household-surveys, the information captured on the characteristics of 
other household members and respondents’ partners is limited to age, schooling, and 
occupation (the latter is only available for current partners). Data on community 
characteristics were not collected. Due to confidentiality policies we only know the province 
                                                 
5  This description of the sample design refers to the 2005 RDHS, with slightly different designs used in the two previous 
RDHS waves. The 1992 RDHS builds on the 1991 Census as a sampling frame. At the time of the 1992 survey collection, a 
civil war was ongoing, with most actions of warfare taking place along the Ugandan-Rwandan border. Due to security 
concerns, 44 rural sectors in the provinces of Byumba and Ruhengeri in northern Rwanda were excluded from the sample 
frame at the outset. The 2000 RDHS builds on the listing of enumeration areas outlined for another household survey, the 
Enquête Intégrale sur les Conditions de Vie des Ménages (EICV) collected in 2000, as no other population records were 
available at the time. The sampling frame of the EICV itself is based on the pre-genocide Census of 1991. Three strata were 
used – Kigali, other urban areas, rural areas – and rural areas were further stratified into provinces, resulting in 13 strata 
(Ministère des Finances et la Planification Economique 2003). The sample design of the 2000 RDHS is only representative of 
rural areas of each province and Kigali City.   10
 
in which a respondent currently resides, but not the administrative unit below the province 
level. This prevents us from merging the RDHS data with secondary data on geographical 
conflict intensity.  
Moreover, no information on income or consumption expenditure is recorded and 
households’ physical asset endowments, such as owning a radio or the quality of roofing 
materials, is the only implicit measure available on household wealth. Instead, we construct 
a wealth index based on recorded household assets. Components of the index include 
durables, such as radio and bicycle, source of drinking water, characteristics of floor 
materials, and type of toilet facility. While the 2000 and 2005 surveys record a larger 
number of assets than the 1992 survey, we construct the asset index based on the same 
categories of assets captured in every survey wave, ensuring full comparability over time. 
Most of these assets are recorded as dichotomous variables, taking 0/1 values, while the few 
categorical variables with multiple categories are manually reorganized along an ordinal 
scale according to costs. The asset variables are first normalized and then transformed into a 
single wealth index through principal component analysis, following an approach proposed 
by Kolenikov and Angeles (2009). Scree plots indicate that the first principal component is 
highly significant in every wave, while further components carry little information, as 
desired. The wealth-index is likely to indicate the long-term economic well-being, as many 
durables captured are typically held by households for many years and are not frequently 
replaced (Sahn and Stifel 2000).  
In between the first and second survey waves an administrative reform took place in which 
the definition of urban areas was revised (Megill 2004), among other things. Some 
communities previously considered rural were now coded as towns, which, to some extent, 
explains the sharp increase in the proportion of urban population. As a consequence, results 
for urban areas are not comparable across the three RDHS waves in a strict sense.  
4.2 Conflict  proxies 
One obvious predictor of being a genocide victim in 1994 is ethnicity (that is, being Tutsi). 
Yet, only the 1992 pre-genocide RDHS wave records ethnicity, as self-reported by 
respondents. In an effort to suppress further ethnic tensions, the post-genocide government  11
 
of Rwanda forbids the usage and identification of ethnic categories. Hence, RDHS collected 
after 1994 does not record respondents’ ethnicity. 
I n  r e s p o n s e  t o  t h i s  c h a l l e n g e ,  w e  c o n s t r u c t several ‘conflict proxies’ measuring likely 
exposure to conflict. These proxies allow us to differentiate two channels through which 
exposure to mass violence may influence fertility: replacement effects (where women 
choose to have children in the post-conflict period to compensate their lost children from 
during the conflict period) and marriage market effects (where a relative shortage of men to 
women creates a ‘bottleneck’ for women to get married). It is important to note that the 
conflict proxies do not necessarily identify victims of targeted genocidal violence. Rather, 
these proxies indicate individuals and age groups that were likely to be exposed to conflict-
related violence. Given that the 1994 genocide occurred within a time span of just about 100 
days, the duration or timing of conflict exposure is of less importance in the Rwandan 
genocide. Table  1 provides on overview of the definition and data source of all conflict 
exposure proxies discussed in the following. 
a)  Child and sibling mortality 
A first proxy that captures replacement effects is whether or not a woman lost a child during 
the genocide (CHILDDEATH). The RDHS questionnaires record child mortality in great detail 
and even ask for the month of death. This allows us to precisely code CHILDDEATH to take 
the value one if a woman lost one or more children between April and July 1994. Moreover, 
we differentiate child death by gender in two further conflict proxies: SONDEATH indicates 
the death of at least one son during the genocide; DAUGHTERDEATH the death of at least 
one daughter. Fig. 2 displays the occurrence of child deaths over time as calculated from the 
2000 and 2005 RDHS. Child deaths peak during the 1994 genocide, although child mortality 
remains relatively high in the immediate post-war period. Given that many mothers would 
have been killed in the genocide at the same time as their (young) children, this proxy 
somewhat underestimates the effects of genocide on child mortality. We interpret this proxy 
as capturing also the negative effects of conflict on health, sanitation and nutrition, leading 
to (even) higher child mortality. 
A second proxy indicating replacement effects uses sibling mortality during the genocide 
(SIBLINGDEATH). Sibling mortality was recorded in the 2000 and 2005 surveys, but not in the  12
 
1992 RDHS. Every prime age woman was asked about all of her siblings born to the same 
mother. Of every sibling, information is available on the sex, date of birth, whether the 
sibling is still living, year of death, and whether the death was related to pregnancy or 
childbirth. This information is recorded irrespective of whether or not the sibling lives in the 
same household as the respondent and thus provides a good geographical coverage of 
deaths occurring across the whole country. However, no information is available on the 
sibling’s place of living or the place of death. The occurrence of sibling deaths over time 
calculated from the 2000 and 2005 RDHS is displayed in Fig. 3. The graphs from both years 
exhibit one single and outstanding peak which coincides with the timing of the 
1994 genocide. The peak of sibling deaths is somewhat less pronounced and spread over a 
slightly longer time period in the 2005 survey. We suggest that this is due to the imprecise 
way the time of death was captured in the questionnaire.
6 Accuracy tests on the sibling 
mortality data collected in the RDHS are discussed in more detail elsewhere.
7 Moreover, we 
disaggregate sibling deaths by gender, differentiating between women who lost a brother 
(BROTHERDEATH) and a sister (SISTERDEATH) in 1994. As discussed below in more detail, 
these variables are likely to capture the direct effects of genocide at the household most 
accurately. Women still living with their parents who recorded a sibling death during the 
genocide have a very high probability of having experienced the sibling death very closely. 
This may shape fertility negatively, for example through the stigma attached to having been 
part of a conflict victim household. 
b)  Marital status and sex ratios 
The third proxy is a specific form of marital status, namely whether or not a woman is a 
widow (WIDOW). This proxy is available in both the pre-genocide and post-genocide RDHS. 
However, the RDHS questionnaire does not record the husband’s cause of death or date of 
death. It is hence impossible to distinguish conflict widows from HIV/AIDS widows or other 
                                                 
6  The original question was ‘How many years ago did [name of sibling] die?’ The 2005 RDHS was collected between 
February and July 2005, while the genocide occurred between April and July 1994. Hence, a woman interviewed in 
February 2005 whose sibling died in May 1994 lost her sibling ten (discrete) years before the interview, which translates 
into 1995. In contrast, the 2000 RDHS was collected between June and November 2000, so most respondents who lost a 
sibling during the genocide period would have reported the death occurring six years ago, which translates into 1994.  
7  Verwimp and de Walque (2010) use the same RDHS data from 2000 to analyze excess mortality patterns related to the 
1994 genocide. They find that the mean and median of both the siblings’ sex and date of birth are similar and conclude that 
there is no evidence for a systematic bias in the reporting of sibling deaths.  13
 
widows. Still, the majority of widows in the 2000 and 2005 waves are very likely to be 
genocide widows (Brück and Schindler 2009) – that is, formerly wives of Tutsi husbands or 
moderate Hutu husbands. Given the gender-unbalanced mortality during the genocide, 
widowhood can be assumed to be exogenous. This point is underlined in Fig.  4, which 
depicts the distribution of current marital status (single, married, divorced, widowed) for 
women of various age groups in 1992, 2000, and 2005. The proportion of widows relative to 
married and unmarried women increased considerably after the genocide, particularly for 
younger women. For instance, the proportion of widows among women of age 25-34 years 
doubled between 1992 and 2000. Moreover, the proportion of widows rises steadily with 
older birth cohorts; a similar pattern is apparent for divorced women. This may indicate that 
once a woman becomes a widow, it is likely that she does not marry again given a lack of 
suitable partners of similar age.
8  
Finally, we calculate a demographic conflict proxy that captures the extent of deaths across 
age groups (SEXRATIO). The data on sex ratio comes from two secondary sources: the 
1991 Census (which is matched with the 1992 RDHS) and the 2002 Census (which is matched 
with the 2000  RDHS and the 2005  RDHS). Women are assigned the average sex ratio 
(defined as the ratio of males to females) in the cohort of their potential partners in a given 
province, taking into account the typical age difference between spouses in Rwanda. More 
precisely, sex ratios in a woman’s five-year age group, one younger age group and two older 
age groups were averaged. While this is our preferred measure, we also calculate the sex 
ratio in a women’s five-year birth cohort and in her exact year of birth as a robustness test. 
These provincial, age group-specific sex ratios are the closest approximation to the local 
marriage market possible with publicly available data. Still, sex ratios derived from census 
data overestimate the number of men potentially available on the marriage market, as tens 
of thousands of male perpetrators of genocide were in jail (Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Planning et al. 2003). 
It is important to note that our analysis is based on a sample of survivors. Households in 
which all (female) members died during the genocide are by definition not accounted for. In 
                                                 
8  Unfortunately, most information on marital history available in the RDHS refers to the current partnership. Hence, we do 
not know whether a woman has ever been widowed and then remarried. Such a woman would simply appear as ‘married’ 
in the data.   14
 
other words, the impact of the genocide is underestimated in the present analysis. However, 
given that the focus of this paper is on the impact of the genocide on the fertility of the 
survivors in the post-genocide period (and not on estimating excess mortality), this does not 
bias our analysis. 
5 Estimation  strategy 
We employ two slightly different estimation strategies to explore the impact of the two 
channels – replacement and marriage market – on fertility. This is due to the fact that 
proxies for conflict exposure measuring replacement effects are only available for post-
genocide RDHS data, while conflict proxies measuring marriage market effects are available 
for both pre-genocide and post-genocide RDHS data. Table 2 provides a schematic summary 
of the estimation strategy. 
To explore the replacement effects of conflict-related deaths on fertility, we conduct cross-
sectional analyses with each of the post-genocide RDHS waves. The 2000 and 2005 RDHS 
provide insights into the short-term (five-year) and long-term (ten-year) effects of genocide 
on fertility, respectively. The dependent variable of interest is the number of children born 
alive in the aftermath of the genocide (while controlling for the number of children 
previously born). This estimation strategy builds on the idea that women may adjust their 
fertility in the post-conflict period, depending on the exact channel through which they were 
affected by the genocide. We exclude children conceived during the genocide (potentially 
through rape) from our analysis. Rather, the focus is on understanding how fertility decisions 
are made during the transition to peace. In the 2000 RDHS, the period of interest is May 
1995 (when the first cohort of children conceived after the genocide is born) to June 2000 
(the start of interviews for the 2000  RDHS). Similarly, in the 2005  RDHS, the dependent 
variable is the number of children born to a woman between May 1995 and February 2005 
(when 2005 data collection began). 
The determinants of fertility are estimated as a reduced-form equation, in line with the 
existing literature, as discussed above, with: 
Ki = α0+ β1Xi+ β2D + β3R + β4Conflicti +μi  (1a)  15
 
where fertility K of woman i is a function of a constant α, a vector of the woman’s socio-
economic characteristics Xi, district-level and province-level characteristics D, region fixed 
effects R, a proxy for conflict exposure Conflicti (as discussed in Section 4.2), and a normally 
distributed error term ui. The estimated coefficient β4 measures the impact of actual conflict 
exposure during the genocide on fertility, relative to all women after the genocide.  
To explore the marriage market effects of conflict on fertility, we exploit the fact that the 
conflict variables are available for all data waves, including the 1992 RDHS collected before 
the genocide. We pool the three cross-sectional RDHS waves pair-wise, combining the 1992 
and 2000 waves and the 1992 and 2005 waves. Pooling surveys allows us to compare post-
genocide fertility trends relative to a pre-genocide baseline period. For instance, inferences 
can be made about fertility of a population subgroup (e.g. widows) after the genocide in 
comparison to a similar population subgroup before the genocide. A similar approach to 
pooling of cross-sectional survey waves is applied by Akresh and de Walque (2008).  
To ensure that the dependent variables are comparable from before and after the genocide, 
the periods are now defined in relative terms. In the pooled 1992-2000 data, the period of 
interest is the number of children born in the five years prior to the data collection. In the 
2000 RDHS, this corresponds to the period between May 1995 and June 2000. This time 
span will be compared to the period between May  1987 and June  1992, when data 
collection for the 1992 RDHS began. Similarly, in the pooled 1992-2005 data, the time span 
of interest is the ten years prior to the starting date of the 2005 RDHS, which is the period 
between  May 1995  and  February 2005.  This corresponds to the period from 
September 1982 to June 1992 in the 1992 RDHS.  
To explore the marriage market effects of conflict on fertility, the following equation is 
estimated:  
Ki = α0+ β1Xi + β2D + β3R + β4Year + β5Conflicti + β6Conflicti x Year + μi  (1b) 
which additionally includes a time dummy Year for the survey year and an interaction term 
between the proxy for conflict exposure Conflicti and the time dummy. The estimated 
coefficient β6 captures the impact of actual conflict exposure on fertility after the genocide 
relative to women with similar risk of exposure to conflict before the genocide.   16
 
Given that we control for the effects of conflict in addition to the usual socio-economic 
determinants of fertility and given that conflict may also affect these other variables, the 
estimated coefficient of the conflict variable can be interpreted as the ‘pure conflict’ effect. 
This makes our calculations conservative estimates of the total effects of conflict on fertility. 
For example, conflict is likely to reduce the educational attainment of children exposed to 
violence during their school-age (Akresh and de Walque 2008) and of girls in particular 
(Shemyakina 2006), hence inter alia raising their fertility.  
In both (1a) and (1b), measures of each woman’s socio-economic characteristics include 
three age categories (young: 15-24 years, middle: 25-34 years, and old: 35-49 years), the 
number of sons and daughters born before the time span of interest, her education (no 
education, some primary education, and some secondary or higher education), a dummy 
variable indicating whether she is currently in a union,
9 a dummy variable indicating whether 
she has had more than one union, a continuous household wealth index (see Section 4.1), a 
dummy variable indicating whether she has always lived in the same community, a dummy 
variable indicating whether the current location is urban, mortality rates of children under 
five years at the district level, population density at the province level, and region fixed 
effects. The return to these variables is assumed to remain constant over all three survey 
years (except age, education, and children previously born, which are interacted with the 
year dummy). Table 4 provides summary statistics of the variables used in the regressions.  
The principle sample includes women aged 15-49 at the time of each survey collection; we 
further adjust the sample to match the definition of each conflict proxy (e.g. we only 
consider a sample of women who gave birth to their first child before the genocide when 
using the CHILDDEATH conflict proxy). The sample comprises both women who have not yet 
given birth to a child and women who have reached menopause. The youngest mother in 
the sample gave her first birth at age 12. In order to account for the different time spans 
that women are at risk of pregnancy, age 12 is used as the onset of exposure to conception.  
The dependent variable in all regressions is a count variable with non-negative integer values 
ranging from 0 to 5 in the short term and 0 to 8 in the long term. We employ a Poisson 
                                                 
9  This variable is not included in the estimation of equation (1b), given that widowhood is strongly correlated with not 
being in union.   17
 
regression model that accounts for both censoring at zero and the integer nature of the 
values, assuming that the count variable follows a Poisson distribution. One key property of 
the Poisson distribution is that the conditional mean and conditional variance of the count 
variable are equal, which implies that counts occur independently from each other (Wang 
and Famoye 1997). The conditional expected value of the count variable is parameterized as 
an exponential function (cf. Cameron and Trivedi 2009). Alternative regression models are 
discussed in Section 6.3.  
As a refinement of the original regression model, we estimate the determinants of fertility 
during the past five and ten years, respectively, separately for different age groups (see 
Table 2). As outlined above, we bundle women into three age groups based on their current 
age at each survey collection. The young age group (15-24 years) consists of those who were 
children or teenagers during the genocide. The women in the middle age group (25-34 years) 
were in the middle of their childbearing years in 1994. The women in the old age group (35-
49  years) were at the late stage of their fertile period at the time of the genocide. 
Differentiating the sample population by age allows us to investigate further the impact of 
the timing of an exposure to violence on a woman’s fertility. 
An econometric problem arises if schooling is endogenous to fertility (e.g. Sander 1992). The 
reasoning is that mothers with children at home have fewer resources (both in terms of time 
and finance) to invest in their own schooling, while there may also be unobserved 
characteristics (such as ability) causing a selection into schooling that may also determine 
fertility. However, in the case of Rwanda, where in 2005 some 84 percent of the population 
lives in the countryside and average levels of schooling are very low, few young women 
continue education beyond age  15. Similar to research conducted in other developing 
countries characterized with low levels of education (e.g. Ainsworth, et al. 1996), education 
is considered to be exogenous to fertility in the following analysis.  
6  Results and discussion  
6.1 Descriptive  statistics 
Total fertility rates (TFR) changed considerably during the survey years, yet not in a linear 
pattern. TFR decreased sharply from 8.5 in 1983 (INS and ORC International 2006: 38) to 6.2  18
 
in 1992 and further reduced to 5.8 in 2000 but increased slightly to 6.1 in 2005. This pattern 
found in Rwanda is distinct from other conflict-affected countries where fertility declined 
during the war and then increased (at least for some time) in the post-war period, as 
previously discussed. 
Some further unconditional statistics on fertility-related variables are displayed in Table 3. 
Both age at first marriage and age at first birth increased consistently between 1992 and 
2005. In contrast, the ideal family size increased sharply after the genocide, from 4.32 
children in 1992 to 5.04 in 2000. The use of modern contraception methods was at a very 
low level and even decreased over time. The proportion of polygamous marriages decreased 
slightly after the genocide. The proportion of women living in female-headed households 
rose by more than 15  percentage points in the post-war period. This again mirrors the 
demographic imbalances. Almost all socio-economic measures related to well-being 
improved over the years.  
6.2 Multivariate  analysis 
Results of Poisson estimations of the determinants of fertility are displayed in Table 5 (short-
term analysis), Table 6 (long-term analysis), and Table 7, 8, and 9 (for young, middle, and old 
women, respectively). The dependent variables used in all these tables are the number of 
children born alive to a woman during the five and ten years before the survey, respectively.  
While Poisson is a natural candidate for estimating models in which the dependent variable 
is a non-negative integer count variable, the assumption of equidispersion is violated 
moderately. Equidispersion seems to be less of an issue in the short-term, where the 
variance-to-mean-ratio is about 1.1, but slightly more so in the long-term, where the 
variance-to-mean-ratio is about 1.7. A formal test establishes that over-dispersion is present 
in most estimations, indicating that the variance is greater than the mean, which would 
underestimate standard errors. We correct for this by computing robust (and cluster-
specific) standard errors. This still retains consistent estimates if the conditional mean 
function is correctly specified (Cameron and Trivedi 2009: 561). The fitted probabilities of 
the Poisson model are acceptable, with the maximum difference in predicted and actual 
probabilities of the count variable ranging between 0.08 (short term) and 0.1 (long term). 
The Poisson prediction of zero counts is relatively precise, while the prediction of two  19
 
children is the least precise. Other regression diagnostics (chi-squared value, log-likelihood 
statistics, AIC, BIC, and the squared coefficient of correlation between fitted and observed 
values of the dependent variable) confirm that Poisson estimations fit the data reasonably 
well. Overall, the model fit in the middle age group, which does not exhibit any natural 
censoring in its fertility, is much better than the fit for the young and old age groups.  
a)  Conflict and fertility in the short term 
Women surveyed in 2000 who lost at least one child during the genocide (CHILDDEATH) gave 
birth to a significantly larger number of children in the short term than other women 
(Table 5). This findings supports the replacement hypothesis: The estimated fertility rate of 
these women is factor exp(0.14)  =  1.15 times the predicted fertility rate of women not 
affected by conflict, controlling for the number of sons and daughters previously born and 
socio-economic factors. Moreover, the gender of the lost child matters: The death of a son 
(SONDEATH) results in significantly higher fertility in the post-war period, while the loss of a 
daughter (DAUGHTERDEATH) does not affect fertility. This result is in line with expectations, 
given that Rwanda is a patrilineal society. Women used to get access to land and resources 
primarily through men, and sons traditionally set up their own household close to their 
parental homestead (Hamilton 2000).
10 
Interestingly, we find the opposite effect for sibling death. Women in 2000 who lost a sibling 
(SIBLINGDEATH) during the genocide have significantly lower fertility (with a factor effect of 
exp(-0.06) = 0.94) in the post-war period compared to women did not loose siblings in 1994, 
holding other factors constant. We also differentiate sibling deaths by the age of the sibling 
relative to the respondent (results available upon request). The death of a younger sibling 
has a significantly negative impact on fertility (by factor exp(-0.09) = 0.91). In contrast, the 
death of older siblings of either gender does not significantly influence fertility.  
We propose that (young) women were more likely to be at home with their parents and 
younger siblings at the time of the genocidal attacks, while men may have been relatively 
more likely to have been attacked away from their homes. The death of a sister or a younger 
                                                 
10 New legislation on succession and marital property regimes became law in 1999, granting women the right to hold 
ownership of property, including land, and to inherit (Burnet and RISD 2001).   20
 
sibling may imply having experienced an attack during the genocide at home. In turn, this 
variable may capture the effect of having witnessed violence committed against close family 
members (and possibly against the respondents as well, including gender-based violence), 
trauma, or stigmatization as a result of belonging to a victimized household.  
As regards the marriage market effects of conflict on fertility, widows before the genocide 
(WIDOW) give birth to a significantly lower number of children than women of other civil 
status in 1992, holding other characteristics constant. Still, widows after the genocide 
(WIDOW  x  YEAR00) have even significantly lower fertility rates than widows before the 
genocide. The fertility rate of widows in 2000 during the past five years is exp(-0.18) = 0.83 
times the fertility rate of widows in the pre-genocide period. This result suggests that 
childbirth continues to be strongly regulated through marriage. Households headed by 
widows (95  percent of widows in the sample are heads of household) thus have fewer 
members than male-headed households due to the death of the husband and fewer children 
born. Moreover, widows do not have a larger number of foster children or non-related 
young household members than other households. In the strongly gendered, labor-
intensive, farm-based economy of rural Rwanda, this may render households of widows 
vulnerable to poverty, particularly at old age (Brück and Schindler 2009).  
In the pre-genocide baseline period, a more balanced sex ratio in the province (SEXRATIO) 
significantly increases fertility. This pattern remains constant over time: The age-group and 
province-specific sex ratios in 2000 (SEXRATIO x YEAR00) do not differ significantly from the 
impact of sex ratios on fertility in 1992.
11 In 2000, the impact of sex ratios on fertility is still 
large (with a factor effect of exp(0.97-0.41) = 1.75). This is despite the fact that sex ratios 
became more unbalanced during the genocide: The mean sex ratio over all age groups of the 
sample is 0.95 in 1992 and 0.85 in 2000. In other words, a shortage of potential partners in a 
woman’s cohort and province significantly reduces the number of children born both before 
and after the genocide.  
Both results indicate that fertility is strongly linked with gender roles and partnership and 
that sexual activity outside of marriage did not become more common after the genocide. 
                                                 
11 This finding is robust even when using slightly different methods of calculating sex ratios, such as the sex ratio in a 
woman’s five-year birth cohort or in her exact year of birth.  21
 
Thus, a relative shortage of men in a given province correlates with a lower number of 
unions. It appears as if there are divergent trends for two groups of women. On the one 
hand, it seems that fertility among married women before and after the genocide remained 
unchanged with married women continuing to have many children. One may speculate that 
the high fertility after the genocide relates to the competition for marriageable partners. 
This may encourage married women to conform to the ideal female role model in Rwanda 
by becoming a mother of a large family (Jefremovas 1991; UNICEF 1997). A similar pattern – 
a local shortage of men causing a stricter gendered division of labor in household tasks – is 
found to influence intra-household time allocation patterns in Rwandan households 
(Schindler 2010). Another reason may be that, despite the genocide, the basic incentives for 
having large families in agricultural production and in providing old age security persisted in 
Rwanda, thus maintaining material benefits for parents of larger families. On the other hand, 
an increasing number of women are without partners in the post-genocide period. These 
women (and especially widows) have lower fertility levels, which may render them 
vulnerable at old age.  
Most of the standard variables predicted by the literature to determine fertility have the 
expected signs. Fertility in the short term is strongly correlated with the number of children 
previously born. Also the sex of children matters: One additional son (SONNUMSHORT) 
changes the fertility rate in the short term by factor exp(-0.05) = 0.95, while one additional 
daughter (DAUGHTNUMSHORT) changes the fertility rate by factor exp(-0.08)  =  0.92. 
Surprisingly, education (PRIMEDU, SECEDU) does not have a significant effect on fertility in 
the early post-war period. This result fits empirical evidence from other early post-war 
economies where education played a minor role in driving post-war socio-economic 
outcomes at the micro-level (e.g. Bozzoli and Brück 2009). In line with expectations, 
household wealth (WEALTHFUL) significantly decreases fertility. Being currently in union 
(INUNION) and living in a more densely populated province (PODENSITY) significantly 
increases fertility in the short term. Child mortality at the district level (DCHILDMORT) – one 
of the few exogenous measures of the health infrastructure that can be constructed from 
RDHS data – does not significantly affect fertility. Women living in cities (URBAN) do not 
have significantly lower fertility compared to their rural counterparts. This is likely due to the 
fact that the impact of the type of residence is already captured by region fixed effects, 
which also account for differences in wealth, infrastructure, and remoteness that we are  22
 
unable to pinpoint more precisely due to the lack of community-level variables recorded in 
the RDHS.  
There is a lack of information recorded in RDHS data on migration history that would allow 
us to identify whether a respondent was an old or new caseload refugee. However, we know 
if a woman has always lived in the same community (NATIVE), thus controlling for migration 
and displacement. Women who never left their community of origin have significantly lower 
fertility compared to women who at least once in their lives shifted the place of residence. 
This finding supports evidence from a previous study on Rwandan refugees (Verwimp and 
van Bavel 2005), which finds that new caseload refugees had 1.04 times the fertility rate of 
Rwandan women who never migrated, after controlling for age, civil status, education, place 
of residence and occupation. It also fits well into the findings of Verwimp and Van Bavel 
(2011) from Burundi, where conflict-related displacement leads to a faster transition into 
motherhood.  
b)  Conflict and fertility in the long term  
Overall, the impact of conflict exposure becomes less pronounced in the long term (Table 6). 
The mean fertility rate in the past ten years of women who lost at least one child during the 
genocide (CHILDDEATH) was exp(0.12) = 1.12 times the fertility rate of women who did not 
lose children during the genocide. Women who lost at least one son (SONDEATH) have 
exp(0.13) = 1.13 more children than the reference group, while again the loss of a daughter 
in 1994 does not significantly influence fertility in the post-genocide period.  
Unlike in the short term, sibling death in 1994 has no significant effects on fertility in the 
long term. These results may indicate that siblings are less important for livelihoods than 
own children, especially as siblings of women play less of a role in asset accumulation, land 
access, and old age security than do a woman’s own children. Alternatively, if sibling death 
captures the immediate exposure to violence at home, trauma, and victimization as argued 
above, these burdens appear to have been overcome in the subsequent five years.  
In contrast, the negative impact of conflict on fertility for widows in 2005 (WIDOW x YEAR05) 
becomes even larger in the long-term compared to the short-term perspective, with a factor  23
 
effect of exp(-0.40) = 0.67. This finding highlights the persistent vulnerability of widows as a 
population subgroup.  
However, the opposite is true for the demographic impact of the conflict. A shortage of 
potential partners continues to limit fertility (with a factor effect of exp(0.98-0.61) = 1.44), 
but less so than in the immediate post-conflict period. This may be due to the fact that a 
larger share of sample respondents in the 2005  RDHS belongs to younger birth cohorts 
which are less severely affected by gender imbalances than in the 2000 RDHS. With respect 
to other control variables, many trends identified in the short term analysis also hold in the 
long term.  
c)  The impact of conflict exposure on fertility by age group 
In order to explore the cohort-specific effects of conflict exposure on fertility, the original 
model is estimated by cohorts. Results for the youngest group of women are displayed in 
Table 7. Women in this age group surveyed in 2000 were 9-18 years old during the genocide; 
those surveyed in 2005 were 4-13 years old during the genocide. Very few sample women 
had given birth to a child before 1994 or were married at that time. Hence, CHILDDEATH, 
SONDEATH, DAUGHTERDEATH, and WIDOW are not used as proxies for conflict exposure in 
this age group. Interestingly, the only proxy for conflict exposure with a significant impact on 
fertility rates in the short term is the death of a sister during the genocide (SISTERDEATH). As 
argued above, this proxy possibly captures the effect of trauma and stigmatization as a 
victimized survivor of the genocide. However, this effect does not significantly impact 
fertility in the long term. Neither before nor after the genocide do sex ratios have a 
significant impact on the fertility of young women. Possibly, for many women of this age 
group, the matching of partners in the marriage market is not yet complete and gender 
imbalances among young women are not as severe compared to older birth cohorts. 
Results show the opposite effect for women in the middle age grouping (of age 25-34 years 
during the survey collection, Table 8): On the one hand, a larger share of these women were 
likely exposed to conflict, while on the other hand, conflict exposure had a strong effect on 
their fertility in the post-conflict period. There is evidence for the replacing-the-lost 
hypothesis: Women of middle age who lost a child in 1994 (CHILDDEATH) give birth to a 
significantly larger number of children compared to other women in both 2000 and 2005,  24
 
holding other factors constant. Widowhood significantly reduces the fertility of middle aged 
women compared to other women in this age group. Being a widow reduces fertility in the 
short term in both the pre- and post-genocide period. The fertility rate of widows in 2005 
(WIDOW  x  YEAR05) was even lower (by a factor exp(-0.41)  =  0.66) compared to widows 
before the genocide. In 1992, sex ratios (SEXRATIO) do not significantly influence fertility 
rates among middle age women. This is very different after the genocide: more balanced sex 
ratios significantly increase fertility rates in the early post-war period (SEXRATIO x YEAR00). 
Given that most of the women of middle age are in union, this finding again suggests that 
fertility and partnership are linked. Considering the number of living children in 2005, 
women of middle age who lost a child during the genocide do not have significantly fewer 
living children than women who were not exposed to conflict (holding other characteristics 
constant). In short, it seems that women who were exposed to the genocide aged 
between 14 and 28 fully adjusted their fertility in the post-war period. 
This is not the case for women in the oldest age group of 35-49 years during the survey 
collection (Table 9). In this age group, the negative effects of conflict exposure on fertility 
prevail – through widowhood (WIDOW x YEAR00; WIDOW x YEAR05), the loss of a brother in 
the short term (BROTHERDEATH), and the loss of a child (CHILDDEATH) and a sister in the 
long term (SISTERDEATH). In fact, women in the oldest age group who lost a child or their 
husband during the genocide have 0.91 and 0.72 fewer living children in 2005, respectively 
compared to women not affected by the genocide. Considering the fact that the dependent 
variables of interest only capture births given during the past five and ten years – and that 
many of the women in the old age group may have reached menopause – this result is not 
surprising. Women who were exposed to conflict between age 29-43 (those surveyed in 
2000) and 24-38 (those surveyed in 2005) have fewer chances to replace close kin who died 
in 1994. To conclude, it is the oldest group of women whose family structure is affected 
most strongly by mortality during the genocide.  
d) Simulation  results 
In order to explore the magnitude of the effects, we predict the number of births and the 
number of living children for women exposed to conflict through different channels for each 
month between January 1990 and January 2005 (Fig. 5). All other socio-economic  25
 
characteristics are held constant at their mean values. Women who lost at least one child 
during the genocide were able to adjust their fertility, although they could not fully make up 
for the lost child (Fig. 5a). However, conflict-affected women were not able to narrow the 
gap in the number of living children compared to women who did not lose children during 
the genocide (Fig. 5b). In part, this is due to higher mortality rates of children born to these 
women, possibly as a result of shorter intervals between births. Women who lost a sibling in 
1994 do not differ significantly in the number of living children in the post-genocide period 
(Fig. 5c). In contrast, for widows the gap in the number of living children becomes larger 
over time compared to women of other civil status (Fig. 5d).  
6.3 Robustness  tests 
We conduct multiple tests on the robustness of the findings (results available upon request). 
First, the determinants of fertility are estimated with a Zero-Inflated Poisson model to allow 
the probability to give birth to the first child to differ across (latent) groups of women.
12 Two 
variants of the Zero-Inflated Poisson model are estimated, with INUNION and the complete 
set of independent variables used as inflation variables determining the binary process. In 
both variants of the Zero-Inflated Poisson model the point estimates of the conflict proxies 
are of comparable magnitude and level of significance as in the original Poisson estimates.
13  
Second, we conduct a placebo genocide test, where we use child deaths and sibling deaths 
occurring between January 1990 and December 1993 as placebo conflict proxies. None of 
the placebo proxies significantly influences fertility in the short-term or long-term post-war 
period. This evidence confirms that our analysis captures fertility effects of the 1994 
genocide.  
Third, we define CHILDDEATH and SIBLINGDEATH as proportions of the total number of 
children and siblings born before the genocide, respectively. This allows the probability to 
                                                 
12 A Negative Binomial model would be our preferred alternative, as it relaxes the assumption of equidispersion. Yet, this 
model has difficulties to converge with the data at hand and the estimate of ln(alpha) is large and negative, which prevents 
the prediction of probabilities. Following Long and Freese (2006), we resort to the Zero-Inflated Poisson model.  
13 Although the Vuong test, fitted probabilities of the count variable, AIC, BIC, and log likelihood all indicate a slightly better 
fit of the Zero-Inflated Poisson model over the Poisson model, the latter allows for a more forward interpretation of the 
estimated coefficients and remains our preferred model.   26
 
lose a child and a sibling to vary with fertility at the time of the genocide and family size. The 
estimated coefficients are larger in magnitude, while the level of significance is similar.  
Fourth, using the 1992  RDHS wave, we compare fertility among Hutu and Tutsi. Of the 
nationally representative sample of women surveyed in the 1992 RDHS, 8.6  percent are 
Tutsi.
14 Descriptive statistics point towards differences across both groups: On average, Tutsi 
women have 0.58 fewer children, they marry 1.73 years later and give birth to the first child 
1.69  years later than Hutu women (all three figures are significantly different in means 
across Hutu and Tutsi). Other socio-economic characteristics differ significantly as well 
across Hutu and Tutsi, including education and wealth. However, it seems that these 
differences in fertility behavior and socio-economic status are driven by the place of 
residence: 14 percent of Tutsi women live in urban areas, compared to 5 percent of Hutu 
women. A regression analysis confirms this: When regressing the total number of children 
on multiple characteristics (including ethnicity, age, education, place of residence, and 
partnership characteristics), ethnicity is no longer statistically significant.  
Fifth, we run all estimates based on the full sample of women in order to enhance the 
comparability and precision of the estimates. In both short-term and long-term analyses, the 
impact of conflict exposure is only slightly smaller in terms of the magnitude of effects and 
the level of significance compared to the original results derived from restricted samples.  
7 Conclusions 
The paper analyzes the effects of mass violent conflict on fertility for conflict-survivors in the 
case of the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 using individual-level data. To enable an 
identification of the genocide at the micro-level, two types of proxies for conflict exposure 
are constructed using three waves of RDHS data from before and after the genocide. With 
this estimation strategy, we identify the ‘pure’ effects of genocide on fertility over and above 
conflict-related effects like urbanization, destroyed infrastructure, and weaker health 
infrastructure – which in turn also affect fertility. We study the short- and long-term effects 
                                                 
14 This self-reported ethnicity variable very likely underestimates the Tutsi population in 1992. Historical accounts on ethnic 
violence before 1994 suggest that many individuals tried to hide their ethnic identity in order to avoid discrimination and 
persecution (Desforges 1999). This may have also been the case in the RDHS data collection.  27
 
of genocide and differentiate the analysis by cohort, kinship relation and gender of the 
deceased persons. 
Our approach is unique in that we estimate the effects of genocide on fertility using multiple 
measures of conflict exposure and disaggregating in more dimensions than done previously. 
In Rwanda, this is important as by law collecting a key conflict proxy, ethnicity, is not 
possible. In other contexts using conflict proxies may be important if data-sets, which do not 
contain any direct identification of conflict at the micro-level, are to be analyzed 
retrospectively.  
The paper has five major findings. First, we find a significant direct (or ‘pure’) effect of mass 
violent conflict in determining fertility. Of all conflict proxies studied, the loss of a child 
during the genocide had the largest (and positive) effect on fertility in the aftermath of the 
genocide. We interpret this as evidence for a replacement effect.  
Second, we observe differential effects of conflict on fertility in the shorter term 
(approximately five years) versus the longer term (approximately ten years) after the 
genocide. Given that we observe significant effects of conflict on fertility even ten years after 
the genocide ended, these findings suggest that the post-conflict period in Rwanda lasted 
just over ten years. 
Third, there are gender-specific effects in both child deaths and sibling deaths. We only find 
evidence for replacement of lost sons, not of lost daughters. This result highlights the 
importance of patrilineality in Rwandan society. It can also be explained by the continued 
role of social norms for land access and old age security. As regards sibling deaths, the loss of 
a sister has a stronger negative impact on fertility than the loss of a brother. This may 
indicate the impact of having experienced genocidal violence at home.  
Fourth, fertility is strongly linked with marital status and marriage markets. Widows face 
significantly lower fertility before and after the conflict, again emphasizing the role of social 
norms for fertility in Rwanda. Imbalanced sex ratios as a demographic conflict proxy appear 
to lead to lower fertility, pointing to the continued role of marriage markets and marital 
status for determining fertility. Some of these effects are more pronounced in the long-term, 
hence indicating that conflict legacies will continue to shape the population growth rate and 
population structure of Rwanda for many years to come.  28
 
Finally, there are cohort-specific effects in that the timing of conflict exposure during a 
woman’s fertile years strongly influences fertility. The fertility of women who were children 
or teenagers during the genocide is not significantly affected by this early conflict exposure. 
Women who were in their mean childbearing years during the genocide are able to adjust 
their fertility and replace lost kin. However, women who were at the end of their fertile 
period during the genocide were too old to adjust fertility in the post-conflict period. Hence, 
the latter group of women is most persistently affected in their fertility by conflict exposure.  
Our findings suggest four implications for the design of post-conflict reconstruction policies. 
First, the results help identify potentially vulnerable groups of survivors of the genocide, like 
widows and households with many killed sons. Understanding the effects of conflict across 
groups in general will help to target future assistance policies more accurately. 
Second, the analysis suggests that within approximately ten years after the genocide, the 
effects of the conflict on fertility start to wear off. From this particular perspective, this dates 
the duration of the post-conflict period, during which policies may need to explicitly account 
for the previous conflict. More generally, there is a need to understand how long post-
conflict periods last after different conflicts in different countries and with respect to 
different variables. For example, it is unlikely that a ‘standard’ population planning policy 
implemented soon after the genocide would have the same effect while the demand for 
children was still partly driven by the need for replacement of lost kin. 
Third, and given that Rwanda has traditionally experienced very high levels of fertility by 
international comparisons, our results indicate the drivers of post-genocide fertility in 
Rwanda and may suggest possible avenues for interventions. Of all policy-related variables 
we considered in the analysis directly, education, migration and the balance of the sex ratios 
(in a country characterized by little internal migration) suggest areas for intervention to 
reduce fertility. Other targets for policy initiatives could include strengthening incentives for 
old age security beyond own children, reducing the reliance on family labor in land access 
and agricultural production and promoting the usage of contraception. 
Fourth, we observe a strong persistence of traditions with some key variables showing a high 
degree of continuity. This is surprising when considering that the genocide induced 
significant structural changes in the economy in other respects, like increased rural-urban 
market integration and urbanization. From a policy perspective, this begs the question if  29
 
these norms and traditions, to the extent that they may have contributed to the emergence 
of mass violent conflict in the first place, represent a potential source of future instability – 
or if the persistent social norms in the realm of fertility can be harnessed for increased 
stability and development in the future.  30
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Source: Calculated from reports on the 1991 Census and the 2002 Census.  31
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Source: RDHS 2000 and RDHS 2005. The graphs display the total number of child deaths and are not adjusted to a larger number of 
children born in recent years.  32
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Source: RDHS 2000 and RDHS 2005. Double counts of the same siblings as reported by respondents living in the same household are 
excluded in these figures.   33
 

































































































Married Widowed Divorced Single
2005
 
Source: RDHS  1992, RDHS  2000, and RDHS  2005. Non-parametric local polynomial regression with Epanechnikov kernel weights. 
Population weights were used.   34
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Time
No widow Widow 95% Confidence interval
(d) Respondent is widow
 
Source: RDHS 2005. Predicted values were calculated from Poisson regressions. All other covariates were held constant at 
their respective means. Robust and cluster-level standard errors were used. Sample: (a) and (b) women whose first child 
was born before the genocide; (c) women whose oldest sibling was born before the genocide; (d) women who had their 
first marriage before the genocide.   35
 
Table 1:  Conflict proxies  
Data source  Variable name  Variable definition in 1992  Variable definition in 2000 and 2005 
1992 2000 2005 
Replacement effects     
CHILDDEATH  –  Respondent’s child died between April-
July 1994 
–  RDHS 2000  RDHS 2005 
SONDEATH  –  Respondent’s son died between April-
July 1994 
–  RDHS 2000  RDHS 2005 
DAUGHTERDEATH  –  Respondent’s daughter died between 
April-July 1994 
–  RDHS 2000  RDHS 2005 
SIBLINGDEATH  –  Respondent’s sibling died in 1994  –  RDHS 2000  RDHS 2005 
BROTHERDEATH  –  Respondent’s brother died in 1994  –  RDHS 2000  RDHS 2005 
SISTERDEATH  –  Respondent’s sister died in 1994  –  RDHS 2000  RDHS 2005 
Marriage market effects         
WIDOW  Respondent is widow  Respondent is widow  RDHS 1992  RDHS 2000  RDHS 2005 
SEXRATIO  Sex ratio in respondents’ 
cohort of potential partners 
per province 
Sex ratio in respondent’s cohort of 
potential partners per province 








Table 2:  Schematic representation of data sources and estimation strategy 
       RDHS  Genocide  RDHS  RDHS 
   1982  1987  1992  1994  1995  2000  2005 
Long-term analysis       5 years    Replacement 
effects  Short-term analysis     10 years 
Long-term analysis    5 years    5 years    Marriage 
market effects  Short-term analysis  10 years    10 years 
Age at survey collection     15-24     15-24  15-24  Age group 1: 
Young Age  during  genocide          9-18  4-13 
Age at survey collection     25-34     25-34  25-34  Age group 2: 
Middle Age  during  genocide          19-28  14-23 
Age at survey collection     35-49     35-49  35-49  Age group 3: 
Old Age  during  genocide          29-43  24-28  36
 






















































































(1992)  (2000) (2005)  (1992) (2000)  (2005) 
Fertility        
CHILDNUM  Number of children ever born  3.06  2.77  2.68  0.056  0.034  0.030 
CHILDDIED  Number of children who died   0.60  0.94  0.86  0.024  0.021  0.018 
PREFCHILD  Ideal number of children  4.32  5.04  4.48  0.039  0.033  0.026 
FAMPLANKNOW  Knows about any modern contraception  0.97  0.93  0.93  0.002  0.003  0.003 
FAMPLANCUR  Currently uses any modern contraception  0.08  0.02  0.04  0.006  0.002  0.002 
FIRSTBIRTHAGE  Age  at  first  birth  21.13 21.55 21.57 0.085 0.055 0.050 
BIRTHCLIN  Delivered last birth in clinic or health center  0.25  0.25  0.29  0.015  0.009  0.009 
Civil status        
SINGLE  Has never been married  0.32  0.34  0.37  0.009  0.005  0.005 
MARRIED  Is currently married  0.57  0.48  0.48  0.010  0.006  0.005 
DIVORCED  Is currently divorced  0.06  0.09  0.09  0.003  0.003  0.003 
WIDOWED  Is currently widowed  0.04  0.07  0.04  0.002  0.003  0.002 
UNIONNUM  Had more than one union  0.11  0.10  0.09  0.005  0.003  0.003 
HUSBANDHOUSE  Partner lives in the same household  0.95  0.87  0.89  0.004  0.006  0.004 
POLYGAM  Lives in polygamous marriage  0.08  0.05  0.05  0.006  0.003  0.002 
FIRSTMARAGE  Age  at  first  marriage  19.77 20.30 20.44 0.083 0.052 0.052 
Education          
CLASNUM  Years of education   3.40  3.71  3.74  0.113  0.064  0.052 
GRADENUM  Number of grades completed  3.24  3.70  3.70  0.101  0.064  0.051 
NOEDU  Has no education  0.37  0.29  0.23  0.013  0.007  0.005 
LITERATE  Is  literate  0.60 0.66 0.70  0.013  0.007  0.006 
Respondents’ socioeconomic characteristics        
AGE  Age  28.28 28.18 28.34 0.114 0.105 0.090 
CATHOLIC  Is  Catholic  0.62 –  0.45  0.020 –  0.011 
PROTESTANT  Is  Protestant  0.21 –  0.37  0.015 –  0.009 
ADVENTIST  Is  Adventist  0.13 –  0.14  0.014 –  0.008 
MUSLIM  Is Muslim   0.01  –  0.01  0.008  –  0.002 
FARMING  Self-employed farming is main occupation  0.85  0.70  0.62  0.010  0.012  0.009 
NATIVE  Has always lived in this community  0.37  0.41  0.37  0.015  0.008  0.008 
Household characteristics         
FEMHEAD  Household head is female  0.19  0.37  0.34  0.008  0.008  0.007 
HHSIZE  Household size   6.18  5.55  5.54  0.075  0.040  0.035 
BIKE  Household owns bike  0.06  0.08  0.11  0.007  0.005  0.005 
QUALHOUSE  Housing floor is of good quality  0.12  0.16  0.14  0.010  0.010  0.007 
Source: RDHS 1992, RDHS 2000, RDHS 2005. Population weights were used. Sample: women of age 15-49 years at the time of survey 
collection.   37
 

























































































































  Variable Description 
(1992) (2000) (2005) (1992) (2000) (2005) (2000) (2000) (2000) 
Dependent variables           
CHILDBORNSHORT  Number of children born alive in last 5 years prior 
to survey collection 
0.89  0.81   0.017  0.013   0  5  10421 
CHILDBORNLONG  Number of children born alive in last 10 years 
prior to survey collection 
1.70   1.45 0.030    0.018  0  8  11320 
Previous children             
SONNUMSHORT  Number of sons born alive more than 5 years prior 
to survey collection 
1.07  0.99   0.024  0.018   0  9  10421 
DAUGHTNUMSHORT  Number of daughters born alive more than 5 years 
prior to survey collection 
1.09  0.96   0.023  0.017   0  10  10421 
SONNUMLONG  Number of sons born alive more than 10 years 
prior to survey collection 
0.67   0.61 0.017    0.012  0  11  11320 
DAUGHTNUMLONG  Number of daughters born alive more than 10 
years prior to survey collection 
0.68   0.61 0.016    0.010  0  9  11320 
Individual characteristics            
YOUNG  Belongs to young age group (15-24 years) (d)  0.41  0.43  0.43  0.006  0.005  0.005  0  1  10421 
MIDDLE  Belongs to middle age group (25-34 years) (d)  0.31  0.27  0.28  0.006  0.004  0.004  0  1  10421 
OLD  Belongs to old age group (35-49 years) (d)  0.26  0.29  0.28  0.005  0.005  0.004  0  1  10421 
NOEDU  Has no education (d)  0.37  0.29  0.23  0.012  0.007  0.005  0  1  10421 
PRIMEDU  Has some primary education (d)  0.54  0.59  0.67  0.010  0.006  0.005  0  1  10421 
SECEDU  Has some secondary or higher education (d)  0.07  0.10  0.09  0.006  0.006  0.004  0  1  10421 
INUNION  Is currently in union (d)  0.57  0.48  0.48  0.009  0.006  0.006  0  1  10421 
UNIONNUM  Respondent had more than one union (d)  0.11  0.10  0.09  0.004  0.003  0.003  0  1  10421 
WEALTHFUL  Household wealth index factor score  -0.28  -0.24  -0.11  0.047  0.046  0.041  -2.38  10.6  10421 
NATIVE  Has always lived in the current community (d)  0.37  0.41  0.37  0.013  0.008  0.008  0  1  10421 
URBAN  Current place of residence is urban (d)  0.06  0.17  0.16  0.008  0.010  0.010  0  1  10421 
DCHILDMORT  Under 5 child mortality rate at district level in 
5 years preceding DHS survey  
0.17 0.18 0.14 0.006  0.003  0.002  0  0.45 10421 
Year dummy             
YEAR00  Survey  collected  in  2000  (d)  0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 10421 
YEAR05  Survey  collected  in  2005  (d)  0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 11320 
Conflict indices           
CHILDDEATH  Child died between April-July 1994 (d)    0.03  0.02    0.002  0.001  0  1  10421 
SONDEATH  Son died between April-July 1994  (d)   0.02  0.01   0.004  0.001  0  1  10421 
DAUGHTERDEATH  Daughter died between April-July 1994 (d)    0.01  0.01    0.001  0.001  0  1  10421 
SIBLINGDEATH  Sibling died in 1994 (d)    0.29  0.27    0.006  0.006  0  1  10421 
BROTHERDEATH  Brother died in 1994 (d)    0.21  0.19    0.005  0.005  0  1  10421 
SISTERDEATH  Sister died in 1994 (d)    0.14  0.13    0.004  0.004  0  1  10421 
WIDOW  Widow  (d)  0.04 0.07 0.04 0.002  0.003  0.002  0  1  10421 
SEXRATIO  Sex ratio in a woman’s cohort of potential 
partners and province 
0.95 0.85 0.88 0.003  0.002  0.004  0  1.64 10421 
Source: RDHS 1992, RDHS 2000, RDHS 2005. Population weights were used. Minimum, maximum, and number of observations refer to 
RDHS 2000; if a variable is only defined for 2005, the reference is RDHS 2005. (d) indicates a dummy variable.   38
 
Table 5:  Determinants of number of children born after genocide in short term 
(Poisson regression)  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)  (11)  (12) 
YOUNG  0.56 1.17 1.16 1.07 0.54 0.55 0.54 1.16 0.30 1.05 0.28 1.00 
 (12.07)***  (14.61)***  (9.11)***  (11.49)*** (11.52)*** (11.21)*** (11.17)*** (14.54)*** (4.76)*** (15.89)***  (4.40)*** (15.06)*** 
MIDDLE  0.69 0.64 0.59 0.62 0.68 0.68 0.67 0.63 0.73 0.69 0.69 0.63 
  (21.03)*** (18.89)*** (15.15)*** (16.10)*** (20.43)*** (19.86)*** (19.75)*** (18.30)*** (18.37)*** (17.83)*** (17.36)*** (17.08)*** 
SONNUMSHORT  -0.05 -0.08 -0.09 -0.07 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.08 -0.04 -0.06 -0.04 -0.05 
  (-5.49)*** (-7.08)*** (-7.02)*** (-6.35)*** (-5.52)*** (-5.09)*** (-5.67)*** (-7.22)*** (-4.19)*** (-5.45)*** (-3.87)*** (-4.86)*** 
DAUGHTNUMSHORT  -0.08 -0.11 -0.12 -0.12 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.10 -0.04 -0.06 -0.04 -0.06 
  (-8.70)***  (-10.44)*** (-10.53)*** (-9.26)*** (-8.66)*** (-8.65)*** (-8.74)*** (-10.30)***  (-4.27)*** (-5.52)*** (-4.01)*** (-5.09)*** 
PRIMEDU  0.01 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.04 -0.09  -0.01  -0.10  -0.02 
  (0.40) (1.17) (0.97) (1.38) (0.63) (0.75) (0.42) (1.46) (-3.57)*** (-0.36)  (-3.82)*** (-0.76) 
SECEDU  -0.04 -0.05 -0.06 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.05 -0.36 -0.11 -0.37 -0.13 
  (-0.78) (-0.76) (-0.83) (-0.53) (-0.72) (-0.63) (-0.61) (-0.80) (-5.23)*** (-1.15)  (-5.40)*** (-1.41) 
INUNION  1.21 0.80 0.80 0.84 1.21 1.21 1.22 0.79        
  (34.12)*** (22.53)*** (19.79)*** (20.99)*** (33.68)*** (32.96)*** (33.92)*** (22.37)***        
UNIONNUM  0.01  -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 0.02  0.02  0.03  -0.03 -0.01 -0.13 -0.01 -0.13 
  (0.45)  (-0.90) (-0.54) (-0.68) (0.67) (0.52) (0.98) (-0.79)  (-0.47) (-4.92)***  (-0.56) (-5.00)*** 
WEALTHINDEX  -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
  (-5.39)*** (-3.47)*** (-3.09)*** (-3.26)*** (-5.29)*** (-5.34)*** (-5.40)*** (-3.50)*** (-3.52)*** (-2.35)**  (-3.49)*** (-2.50)** 
NATIVE  -0.08 0.03  0.04  0.04  -0.09 -0.10 -0.09 0.02  -0.37 -0.03 -0.37 -0.03 
  (-3.36)***  (0.96) (1.37) (1.26) (-3.57)*** (-3.80)*** (-3.67)*** (0.73)  (-14.09)*** (-1.44)  (-14.13)*** (-1.43) 
URBAN  0.05  -0.05 -0.08 -0.02 0.05  0.06  0.05  -0.02 -0.09 -0.14 -0.09 -0.14 
  (1.31)  (-0.89) (-1.39) (-0.34) (1.43) (1.57) (1.32) (-0.34)  (-2.07)** (-3.08)***  (-2.06)** (-3.02)*** 
DCHILDMORT  0.31 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.30 0.33 0.31 0.38 0.16 0.10 0.15 0.08 
  (2.07)**  (1.85)* (1.68)* (1.66)* (2.04)**  (2.24)**  (2.04)**  (1.93)* (1.10)  (0.65)  (1.05)  (0.52) 
POPDENSITY  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  (1.70)*  (1.23) (1.17) (0.81) (1.74)* (1.75)* (1.66)* (1.28)  (1.40) (1.59) (2.26)**  (2.95)*** 
YEAR00          -0.18  -0.12  -0.15  -0.07 
          (-2.43)**  (-1.66)*  (-1.92)*  (-0.94) 
CHILDDEATH   0.14            
   (3.18)***            
SONDEATH    0.14      0.16      
    (2.49)**      (2.86)***      
DAUGHTERDEATH     0.09     0.09      
     (1.37)     (1.42)      
S I B L I N G D E A T H       - 0 . 0 6          
      (-2.54)**         
BROTHERDEATH       -0.06   -0.10      
       (-2.40)**   (-2.95)***      
SISTERDEATH       -0.08  -0.05      
        (-2.85)***  (-1.28)      
W I D O W            - 0 . 5 7    - 0 . 5 7  
           (-6.72)***   (-6.79)*** 
W I D O W   x   Y E A R 0 0            - 0 . 1 8    - 0 . 1 8  
           (-1.73)*   (-1.75)* 
SEXRATIO            0.97  1.54 
            (3.53)***  (4.46)*** 
SEXRATIO  x  YEAR00            -0.41  -0.70 
            (-1.20)  (-1.65)* 
Constant  -4.12 -3.66 -3.57 -3.63 -4.10 -4.10 -4.09 -3.63 -2.91 -2.89 -3.82 -4.33 
  (-58.26)*** (-45.09)*** (-36.85)*** (-38.51)*** (-57.32)*** (-57.06)*** (-56.50)*** (-44.69)*** (-35.38)*** (-35.91)*** (-14.00)*** (-12.57)*** 
AIC  20062.01 11333.88 9444.63  9479.31  19732.25 18883.06 18834.80 11131.71 36023.65 21120.44 36005.02 21091.19 
BIC  20192.54 11455.10 9562.46  9597.05  19869.74 19019.62 18971.29 11271.70 36240.36 21329.21 36237.20 21313.88 
Chi-square  3828.48 2567.98 2037.11 2060.77 3765.80 3574.23 3624.20 2543.14 3640.48 3933.68 3657.28 3964.26 
Pseudo  Log-Likelihood -10013.01  -5647.94 -4703.31 -4720.65 -9847.13 -9422.53 -9398.40 -5543.85 -17983.83  -10530.22  -17972.51  -10513.60 
Sq.  correlation  coefficient  0.38 0.32 0.30 0.33 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.32 0.25 0.16 0.25 0.16 
Observations  10421  4358 3648 3630 10260  9772 9736 4287 16972  7777 16972  7777 
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Note: Robust and cluster-level t-statistics in brackets with * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Sample: women of age 15-49 years at the time of 
survey collection (sample is further adjusted to match each conflict proxy). OLD is the reference category in age groups. Region fixed 
effects included. Models 9-12 include additional interaction terms between YEAR00 and age group, education, children previously born 
(not shown).  39
 
Table 6:  Determinants of number of children born after genocide in long term 
(Poisson regression)  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)  (11)  (12) 
YOUNG  -0.18 1.21    1.17  -0.18 -0.16 -0.17 1.32  -0.53 -13.64  -0.56 -13.27 
 (-5.04)***  (27.63)***    (23.52)***  (-4.93)*** (-4.24)*** (-4.57)*** (24.83)***  (-10.29)*** (-13.54)*** (-10.68)*** (-13.15)*** 
MIDDLE  0.41 0.44 0.42 0.43 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.43 0.35 0.42 0.31 0.36 
  (15.73)*** (15.27)*** (11.57)*** (12.32)*** (15.64)*** (15.23)*** (15.17)*** (15.08)*** (11.29)*** (14.78)*** (10.23)*** (12.71)*** 
SONNUMLONG  -0.09 -0.11 -0.12 -0.12 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.11 -0.06 -0.07 -0.05 -0.06 
  (-10.84)*** (-12.34)*** (-10.47)*** (-11.49)*** (-10.82)*** (-10.55)*** (-10.51)*** (-12.35)*** (-7.65)***  (-8.21)***  (-6.88)*** (-6.87)*** 
DAUGHTNUMLONG  -0.06 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.09 -0.06 -0.07 -0.06 -0.07 
  (-7.52)*** (-9.88)*** (-9.25)*** (-9.00)*** (-7.28)*** (-6.88)*** (-7.22)*** (-9.58)*** (-6.60)*** (-7.94)*** (-6.05)*** (-7.04)*** 
PRIMEDU  -0.03 0.00  0.00  -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 0.00  -0.07 0.00  -0.08 -0.01 
  (-1.63)  (0.12) (0.11) (-0.20)  (-1.47) (-1.29) (-1.11) (0.17)  (-3.98)*** (0.02)  (-4.31)*** (-0.48) 
SECEDU  -0.14 -0.10 -0.11 -0.11 -0.13 -0.13 -0.12 -0.09 -0.41 -0.20 -0.42 -0.21 
  (-3.99)***  (-1.47) (-1.45) (-1.46) (-3.82)*** (-3.70)*** (-3.59)*** (-1.34)  (-7.18)*** (-2.82)*** (-7.46)*** (-2.99)*** 
INUNION  1.08 0.78 0.81 0.78 1.08 1.07 1.06 0.78        
  (36.88)*** (23.44)*** (20.45)*** (21.54)*** (36.89)*** (36.23)*** (35.47)*** (23.31)***        
UNIONNUM  0.03  -0.06 -0.05 -0.04 0.03  0.04  0.03  -0.06 -0.01 -0.14 -0.01 -0.14 
 (1.31)  (-2.01)**  (-1.46)  (-1.22)  (1.38) (1.56) (1.28) (-1.94)*  (-0.66) (-6.65)***  (-0.73) (-6.77)*** 
WEALTHINDEX  -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 -0.00 -0.02 -0.01 
 (-5.30)***  (-1.82)*  (-1.52)  (-2.04)**  (-5.27)*** (-5.09)*** (-5.17)*** (-1.88)*  (-3.41)*** (-0.51)  (-3.32)*** (-0.60) 
NATIVE  -0.14 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.14 -0.14 -0.14 -0.03 -0.35 -0.04 -0.35 -0.04 
  (-6.71)***  (-1.01) (-0.56) (-0.98) (-6.84)*** (-6.78)*** (-6.67)*** (-1.21)  (-15.76)*** (-1.83)*  (-15.85)*** (-1.75)* 
URBAN  0.03 0.01 0.03 -0.00  0.04 0.04 0.04 0.02 -0.05  -0.04  -0.05  -0.04 
  (1.24) (0.31) (0.65) (-0.02)  (1.36) (1.46) (1.29) (0.48) (-2.00)**  (-1.25)  (-2.03)**  (-1.23) 
DCHILDMORT  0.04  -0.16 -0.31 -0.28 0.06  0.05  -0.02 -0.12 0.09  0.00  0.07  -0.04 
  (0.23)  (-0.71) (-1.18) (-1.10) (0.35)  (0.30)  (-0.11) (-0.54) (0.72)  (0.02)  (0.58)  (-0.30) 
POPDENSITY  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  (2.08)**  (1.64) (1.63) (1.82)*  (2.16)** (2.51)** (2.28)** (1.51)  (2.18)** (1.86)*  (3.06)***  (3.42)*** 
YEAR05          -0.28  -0.19  -0.25  -0.12 
          (-5.48)***  (-3.55)***  (-4.88)***  (-2.15)** 
CHILDDEATH  0.12            
   (2.84)***            
SONDEATH    0.13      0.17      
    (2.11)**      (2.91)***      
DAUGHTERDEATH     0.07     0.06      
     (1.01)     (0.98)      
S I B L I N G D E A T H       - 0 . 0 0          
      (-0.21)         
BROTHERDEATH       0.01   0.02      
       (0.46)   (0.64)      
SISTERDEATH        -0.02  -0.12      
        (-1.04)  (-3.43)***      
W I D O W            - 0 . 3 0    - 0 . 3 0  
           (-5.71)***   (-5.80)*** 
W I D O W   x   Y E A R 0 5            - 0 . 4 0    - 0 . 3 9  
           (-5.42)***   (-5.41)*** 
SEXRATIO            0.98  1.63 
            (4.42)***  (5.35)*** 
SEXRATIO  x  YEAR05            -0.61  -0.82 
            (-2.37)**  (-2.33)** 
Constant  -3.17 -2.78 -2.77 -2.76 -3.18 -3.19 -3.16 -2.77 -2.01 -2.01 -2.91 -3.54 
  (-57.14)*** (-38.42)*** (-33.05)*** (-33.70)*** (-56.53)*** (-56.08)*** (-55.33)*** (-38.72)*** (-35.56)*** (-33.29)*** (-13.46)*** (-11.95)*** 
AIC  27540.10 11871.68 9599.27  9744.91  27199.54 26123.24 25982.44 11707.91 48304.59 22314.18 48271.94 22257.40 
BIC  27672.12 11988.24 9705.93  9857.81  27338.62 26261.28 26120.36 11842.62 48522.73 22508.55 48505.67 22465.17 
Chi-square  5767.92 20383.17  1388.66 17410.18  5704.09 5425.11 5325.66 20409.20  5225.13 3401.27 5232.66 3377.23 
Pseudo  log-likelihood  -13752.05 -5916.84  -4781.63  -4853.45  -13580.77 -13042.62 -12972.22 -5831.95  -24124.29 -11128.09 -24105.97 -11097.70 
Sq. correlation 
coefficient 
0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.25 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.16 
Observations  11320 3411  2768  2814  11161 10564 10495 3372  17871 6017  17871 6017 
RDHS data from  2005  2005  2005  2005  2005  2005  2005  1992 & 2005  1992 & 2005  1992 & 2005  1992 & 2005  1992 & 2005 
Sample All  women 




























































Note: Robust and cluster-level t-statistics in brackets with * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Sample: women of age 15-49 years at the time of 
survey collection (sample is further adjusted to match each conflict proxy). OLD is the reference category in age groups. Region fixed 
effects included. Models 9-12 include additional interaction terms between YEAR05 and age group, education, children previously born 
(not shown).   40
 
Table 7:  Determinants of number of children born after genocide in youngest age group 
(Poisson regression)  
  Short-term analysis 
  Dependent variable: CHILDBORNSHORT 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
SIBLINGDEATH  -0.04      
  (-0.79)      
BROTHERDEATH    -0.04   -0.01  
    (-0.62)   (-0.16)  
SISTERDEATH      -0.12 -0.11  
     (-1.87)*  (-1.63)   
S E X R A T I O       - 0 . 6 8  
      (-0.49) 
SEXRATIO  x  YEAR00      -1.00 
      (-0.65) 
AIC  4508.07 4341.52 4324.19 4508.84 8477.56 
BIC  4623.86 4456.39 4438.93 4631.07 8671.04 
Chi-square  1891.52 1851.95 1782.29 2166.88 2247.27 
Pseudo  Log-Likelihood -2236.03 -2152.76 -2144.10 -2235.42 -4210.78 
Sq.  correlation  coefficient  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.01 
Observations  4596 4368 4335 4596 7406 
RDHS data from  2000  2000  2000  1992 & 2000  1992 & 2000 
Sample Young  women 
whose oldest 












sibling were born 
before genocide 
All young women 
       
  Long-term analysis 
  Dependent variable: CHILDBORNLONG 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
SIBLINGDEATH  0.02      
  (0.35)      
BROTHERDEATH    0.01   0.01  
    (0.16)   (0.17)  
SISTERDEATH      0.06 0.07  
      (1.06) (1.17)  
S E X R A T I O       - 0 . 6 3  
      (-0.46) 
SEXRATIO  x  YEAR05      -1.57 
      (-1.01) 
AIC  4947.74 4704.90 4716.74 4948.67 9085.19 
BIC  5058.08 4813.87 4825.70 5065.51 9265.82 
Chi-square  2151.71 2008.40 1999.45 2160.21 3661.60 
Pseudo  Log-Likelihood -2456.87 -2335.45 -2341.37 -2456.34 -4516.59 
Sq.  correlation  coefficient  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Observations  4870 4492 4489 4870 7688 
RDHS data from  2005  2005  2005  1992 & 2005  1992 & 2005 
Sample Young  women 
whose oldest 












sibling were born 
before genocide 
All young women 
Note: Robust and cluster-level t-statistics in brackets with * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Only coefficients of conflict proxies are shown. 
CHILDDEATH, SONDEATH, DAUGHTERDEATH and WIDOW were not included as conflict proxies given that there was very little variation in 
these variables. The same set of socio-economic and region fixed effects as in the original model is used, but now also AGE is included. 
Sample: women of age 15-24 years at the time of survey collection (sample is further adjusted to match each conflict proxy).  41
 
Table 8:  Determinants of number of children born after genocide in middle age group 
(Poisson regression)  
  Short-term analysis 
  Dependent variable: CHILDBORNSHORT 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
C H I L D D E A T H  0 . 1 1            
  ( 2 . 0 0 ) * *            
SONDEATH   0.07      0.12     
   (0.95)      (1.78)*     
DAUGHTERDEATH    0.03     0.07     
    (0.30)     (0.85)     
S I B L I N G D E A T H      - 0 . 0 2         
     ( - 0 . 8 6 )         
BROTHERDEATH      -0.03   -0.05     
      (-0.94)   (-1.14)     
SISTERDEATH       -0.06  -0.03     
       (-1.57)  (-0.65)     
W I D O W          - 0 . 5 0    - 0 . 5 0  
         (-4.31)***   (-4.28)*** 
WIDOW  x  YEAR00         0.01   0.01 
         ( 0 . 0 4 )    ( 0 . 0 5 )  
S E X R A T I O           - 0 . 5 5   - 0 . 7 9  
          (-1.27)  (-1.97)** 
SEXRATIO  x  YEAR00          1.13  1.22 
          ( 2 . 0 8 ) * *   ( 2 . 2 3 ) * *  
AIC  4129.85 2836.06 2881.29 7510.39 7218.84 7197.71 4071.99 8765.83 13636.63  8767.11 
BIC  4225.54 2924.91 2970.16 7617.41 7325.15 7303.95 4183.33 8935.05 13818.89  8948.42 
Chi-square  273.42 170.12 215.41 605.84 588.59 590.95 274.27 606.98 513.99 614.50 
Pseudo  Log-Likelihood  -2046.93 -1400.03 -1422.65 -3737.19 -3591.42 -3580.85 -2015.00 -4354.92 -6790.31 -4353.55 
Sq.  correlation  coefficient  0.43 0.43 0.42 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.43 0.15 0.29 0.15 
Observations  1504 1029 1030 2823 2713 2704 1483 3114 4961 3114 
RDHS data from  2000  2000  2000  2000  2000  2000  2000  1992 & 2000  1992 & 2000  1992 & 2000 


























































            
            
  Long-term analysis 
  Dependent variable: CHILDBORNLONG 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
C H I L D D E A T H  0 . 1 1            
  ( 2 . 0 3 ) * *            
SONDEATH   0.15      0.14     
   (2.04)**      (2.12)**     
DAUGHTERDEATH    0.08     0.04     
    (1.06)     (0.48)     
S I B L I N G D E A T H      0 . 0 1         
     ( 0 . 4 0 )         
BROTHERDEATH      0.00   0.07     
      (0.00)   (1.35)     
SISTERDEATH       -0.00  -0.08     
       (-0.04)  (-1.12)     
W I D O W          - 0 . 1 8    - 0 . 1 8  
         (-2.64)***   (-2.66)*** 
W I D O W   x   Y E A R 0 5          - 0 . 4 1    - 0 . 4 1  
         (-2.65)***   (-2.61)*** 
S E X R A T I O           - 0 . 2 8   - 0 . 8 8  
          (-0.82)  (-2.60)*** 
SEXRATIO  x  YEAR05          0.60  1.05 
          ( 1 . 3 9 )   ( 2 . 0 2 ) * *  
AIC  2024.11 1137.70 1272.72 10585.40  10193.52  10086.40  1996.33 5370.59 18630.51  5371.93 
BIC  2102.52 1205.70 1342.92 10694.47  10301.93  10194.58  2087.55 5519.03 18814.65  5530.97 
Chi-square  148.78 118.91 109.25 690.77 650.29 646.63 148.87 311.94 470.14 324.70 
Pseudo  Log-Likelihood  -994.06 -550.85 -618.36 -5274.70  -5078.76  -5025.20  -977.17 -2657.30  -9287.25  -2655.97 
Sq.  correlation  coefficient  0.46 0.39 0.45 0.42 0.41 0.42 0.46 0.17 0.26 0.15 
Observations  576 323 365 3163  3050  3012  569 1482  5305  1482 
RDHS data from  2005  2005  2005  2005  2005  2005  2005  1992 & 2005  1992 & 2005  1992 & 2005 


























































Note: Robust and cluster-level t-statistics in brackets with * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Only coefficients of conflict proxies are shown. 
The same set of socio-economic and region fixed effects as in the original model is used, but now also AGE is included. Sample: women of 
age 25-34 years at the time of survey collection (sample is further adjusted to match each conflict proxy).   42
 
 Table 9:  Determinants of number of children born after genocide in oldest age group 
(Poisson regression)  
  Short-term analysis 
  Dependent variable: CHILDBORNSHORT 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
C H I L D D E A T H   0 . 0 9            
  ( 1 . 6 1 )            
SONDEATH   0.11      0.12     
   ( 1 . 6 1 )       ( 1 . 6 2 )      
DAUGHTERDEATH    0.10     0.09     
    ( 1 . 1 0 )      ( 1 . 0 4 )      
S I B L I N G D E A T H      - 0 . 0 5         
     ( - 1 . 3 8 )         
B R O T H E R D E A T H       - 0 . 0 9    - 0 . 0 9      
      (-2.00)**   (-2.00)**     
SISTERDEATH      -0.02  0.00     
       (-0.40)  (0.02)     
W I D O W          - 0 . 4 6    - 0 . 4 6  
         (-4.88)***   (-4.91)*** 
W I D O W   x   Y E A R 0 0          - 0 . 3 1    - 0 . 3 0  
         (-2.60)***   (-2.59)*** 
SEXRATIO          0.83  0.83 
          ( 1 . 6 1 )   ( 1 . 6 3 )  
SEXRATIO  x  YEAR00          -0.59  -0.69 
          (-0.95)  (-1.16) 
AIC  6432.93 5964.26 5939.59 6496.12 6163.75 6165.18 6330.53 10626.01  11070.35  10627.60 
BIC  6539.81 6069.75 6044.92 6603.26 6269.90 6271.38 6454.87 10805.47  11250.53  10819.86 
Chi-square  1287.19 1214.30 1192.72 1276.93 1208.41 1227.63 1260.54 1827.70 1604.99 1823.98 
Pseudo  Log-Likelihood -3198.46 -2964.13 -2951.79 -3230.06 -3063.87 -3064.59 -3144.27 -5285.01 -5507.18 -5283.80 
Sq.  correlation  coefficient  0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.05 0.04 0.04 
Observations  2802 2593 2570 2841 2691 2697 2754 4487 4605 4487 
RDHS data from  2000  2000  2000  2000  2000  2000  2000  1992 & 2000  1992 & 2000  1992 & 2000 

















































            
  
  Long-term analysis 
  Dependent variable: CHILDBORNLONG 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
C H I L D D E A T H   0 . 1 0            
  ( 2 . 1 7 ) * *            
SONDEATH   0.11      0.15     
   ( 1 . 8 0 ) *       ( 2 . 4 6 ) * *      
DAUGHTERDEATH    0.03     0.03     
    ( 0 . 4 3 )      ( 0 . 4 3 )      
S I B L I N G D E A T H      - 0 . 0 3         
     ( - 1 . 1 7 )         
BROTHERDEATH      0.02   0.03     
      ( 0 . 7 0 )    ( 1 . 0 8 )      
S I S T E R D E A T H       - 0 . 0 8   - 0 . 1 0      
       (-2.53)**  (-3.02)***     
W I D O W          - 0 . 2 9    - 0 . 2 9  
         (-5.41)***   (-5.43)*** 
W I D O W   x   Y E A R 0 5          - 0 . 3 2    - 0 . 3 1  
         (-4.29)***   (-4.22)*** 
SEXRATIO          0.79  0.74 
          ( 2 . 4 8 ) * *   ( 2 . 3 2 ) * *  
SEXRATIO  x  YEAR05          0.11  0.05 
          ( 0 . 2 8 )   ( 0 . 1 4 )  
AIC  9132.32 7882.16 7902.25 10045.80  9686.50 9630.45 16959.23  15581.14  16938.83  15565.42 
BIC  9239.41 7986.59 8006.70 10154.67  9794.75 9738.52 17128.03  15760.88  17120.62  15758.00 
Chi-square  2028.85 1764.72 1722.89 2137.50 2086.08 2017.83 2160.72 2367.31 2151.02 2359.73 
Pseudo  Log-Likelihood -4548.16 -3923.08 -3933.12 -5004.90 -4825.25 -4797.22 -8453.61 -7762.57 -8441.41 -7752.71 
Sq.  correlation  coefficient  0.10 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.11 0.06 0.06 0.05 
Observations  2834 2445 2448 3128 3022 2994 2802 4534 4878 4534 
RDHS data from  2005  2005  2005  2005  2005  2005  2005  1992 & 2005  1992 & 2005  1992 & 2005 

















































Note: Robust and cluster-level t-statistics in brackets with * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Only coefficients of conflict proxies are shown. 
The same set of socio-economic and region fixed effects as in the original model is used, but now also AGE is included. Sample: women of 
age 35-49 years at the time of survey collection (sample is further adjusted to match each conflict proxy).  43
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